西南财经大学
Jie Li, Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE)： Do Capital Controls Reduce the Volatility of Gross Capital Inflows and
Outflows? Intended and Unintended Consequences
（[西财新闻] 发布于 ：
光华讲坛―社会名流与企业家论坛第2819期
主讲人： Jie Li, Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE)
主& 题： Do Capital Controls Reduce the Volatility of Gross Capital Inflows and &Outflows? Intended and Unintended Consequences
主持人：Yan Shu, Associate Professor, RIEM
时& 间：13:55-15:30, December 7, Friday
地& 点：柳林校区颐德楼H505
主& 办：经济与管理研究院& 科研处
主讲人简介：
李杰, 中央财经大学副教授,中央财经大学外汇储备研究中心主任 ,
英文杂志JICEP副主编
教育背景 :
经济学（国际金融方向）博士，克莱蒙特大学，加州，美国& 2006
数学硕士，克莱蒙特大学，加州，美国& 2003
世界经济硕士，厦门大学& 2000
国际经济学学士，厦门大学& 1997
研究及教学兴趣 :
& 国际货币与金融、数理金融、金融经济学、中国及亚洲经济
Abstract: The impact of capital controls on the magnitude of international capital flows has been a subject of much interest and research. Far fewer studies have examined if and how capital controls affect the volatility rather than the level of capital flows. Accordingly, this paper uses a new dataset on capital controls from Schindler (2009) and gross capital flow data from Lane and Milessi-Feretti (2007) to investigate whether various capital controls lower the volatility of various types of gross capital flows after controlling for a broad set of domestic macroeconomic, financial and global factors. We explore both the effects of different types of capital inflows and outflows on the volatility of corresponding flows (own effects) as well as the impact of controls of a certain type on the volatility of other components of capital flows (cross effects). Our results suggest that restrictions on equity outflows may be the most preferable form of capital controls in terms of reducing capital flow volatility.
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, December 2011, Pages 700–710
Capital controls and welfare ,
Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501, JapanThis paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls and compares them with the welfare level under perfect capital mobility by using the methodology of . We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal and that capital controls may enhance an economy&s welfare level. There exists an optimal degree of capital-account restriction that achieves a higher level of welfare than that under perfect capital mobility, if the economy has costly financial intermediaries. The results of our analysis imply that as the domestic financial intermediaries are less efficient, the government should impose stricter capital controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing.Highlights? This paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls. ? We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal. ? There exists an optimal degree of capital control, if financial intermediaries are costly. ? As financial intermediaries are less efficient, stricter controls should be imposed.JEL classificationF41KeywordsCapital controls; Welfare; DSGE; Small open economy
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